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promulgating regulations requiring permits to graze stock on national
forest lands. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that historical
acquiescence on the part of the federal government allowing private
use of public lands was never intended to confer any vested right. This
"tacit consent" by the government does not deprive it of the power
to
recall any implied license.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Laneys did not hold and
never held a vested private property right to graze cattle on federal
public lands. The Laneys' predecessor in title held simply an implied
license to use the lands for grazing. This privilege conferred no vested
rights and was revocable at the government's will. Thus, without
regard to the validity of predecessor's claimed water right, the Laneys
were not entitled to graze cattle on national forest lands without a
permit. Additionally, the court upheld the district court's assessment
of penalties and injunction for unpermitted grazing.
John B. Ridgley

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Driscoll v. Adams, 181 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
stormwater discharged during timber harvesting and land
development activities fell within the Clean Water Act's ("CWA")
definition of "pollutant" from a "point source" into "navigable water"
and landowner's failure to make every good faith effort to comply with
pollution control standards and failure to reduce discharges to a
minimum precluded application of the exception to liability under
CWA for discharge without a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES") permit even though no permit was available to be
issued by the state).
Adams owned 76 acres of land in the mountains of North Georgia.
The Driscoll and Galbreath families owned land adjacent to Adams'
property. Driscoll owned five acres directly abutting Adams' property,
and Galbreath owned approximately two acres adjacent to Driscoll's.
The Spiva Branch stream flowed downhill from Adams' property
through a pond on Driscoll's property and then through another
pond on Galbreath's property before merging into another river.
Adams began harvesting timber in March of 1995 in order to
develop his property for vacation homes. He cut and graded roads,
installed storm pipes, and removed timber. This activity caused
erosion which Adams did little to prevent. This erosion caused
considerable damage to Driscoll's and Galbreath's properties. Adams
did not seek proper approval from any federal, state, or local
government agency before starting work on his property.
In
September 1996, Adams filed for the required state permit after
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completing most of the timber harvest. Adams never obtained a
NPDES permit, which is required for lawful pollutant discharge under
the CWA. General stormwater permits were not available in Georgia.
Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in December 1996 against Adams for
violating the CWA. They included in their complaint state law claims
for nuisance, trespass, and negligence. They filed a motion for
summary judgment, and Adams filed a motion to dismiss, which the
court treated as a cross motion for summaryjudgment. The trial court
denied the plaintiffs' motion and granted Adams' motion. The court
stated that because the NPDES permit was an impossible condition in
Georgia, and since there were no approved federal standards, the
complaint should be dismissed. The trial court declined to retain
jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismissed them without
reaching the merits. The Driscolls and Galbreaths appealed.
In his defense, Adams raised two issues on appeal. First, he
claimed that the CWA's prohibition on pollutant discharge does not
apply where the NPDES permit, normally required to make the
discharge lawful, is not available in the state. Second, he claimed that
his discharges did not fall within the CWA's definition of a release of a
"pollutant" from a "point source" into "navigable water".
The CWA provides that the discharge of any pollutant by any
person shall be unlawful except as in compliance with other sections of
the Act. The CWA grants the EPA authority to issue permits that allow
individuals to discharge limited quantities of pollutants under certain
conditions. The EPA delegates this authority to the state. Georgia
Environmental Protection Department ("EPD") was approved to
administer the state NPDES program.
The EPD has tried
unsuccessfully to implement a "general" NPDES stormwater discharge
permit that would cover an entire class of dischargers. However, due
to court challenges, this permit is unavailable in Georgia.
In Hughey v. JMS Development Corp., the Eleventh Circuit created a
narrow exception to the general rule of liability for discharges without
an NPDES permit. The court in Hughey held that (1) where
compliance was factually impossible because there would always be
some stormwater runoff from an area of development; (2) there was
no NDPES permit available; (3) the discharger was in good faith
compliance with local pollution control requirements; and (4) the
discharges were minimal, a party could discharge without violating the
CWA.
The court found that Adams did not meet the four
requirements established in Hughey. Although Adams met the first two
elements, the court held that he did not discharge in good faith as he
made no attempt to obtain the required permits and his discharges
were not minimal. Thus, the exception did not apply.
The court held that Adams' discharges fell within the scope of
prohibited pollutant discharges under the CWA.
The CWA's
definition of "pollutant" includes sand and silt, two of the primary
sediments deposited in plaintiffs ponds by Adams' development
activities. The CWA's definition of "point source" includes "any
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not
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limited to, any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit. . ." Here, Adams
constructed pipes and other means by which stormwater was
transported into the streams which the court held to be a point source.
Finally, the CWA defines "navigable waters" as "waters of the United
States, including territorial seas." The court held that the Act makes it
clear that Congress intended to include ditches, canals, as well as
streams and creeks, under the term "waters of the United States."
Thus, the court found that the Spiva Branch stream fell within the
definition.
The appellate court reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in Adams' favor on the CWA claim and vacated the district
court's dismissal of the state law claims. The case was remanded for
further proceedings.
Kimberley Crawford

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Iberville Parish Waterworks Dist. No. 3 v. Novartis Crop Protection,
Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 934 (S.D. Ala. 1999) (holding that water systems
lacked standing to bring claims against herbicide manufacturer absent
current or imminent injury).
Two waters systems, one in Iberville Parish, Louisiana and the
other in Bowling Green, Ohio, ("Water Systems") sued Novartis, the
manufacturer of Atrazine. Deemed an environmental hazard by the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), Atrazine is a herbicide that
corn, sorghum and sugar cane farmers use to control pre-emergence
broad leaf weeds. The EPA had set limits on the levels of this
contaminant for drinking water and also certified that the best way to
remove it from water was to use a granular activated carbon ("GAC")
filtration system. The plaintiffs, like many other water systems, did not
have permanent GAC systems and the cost to install them was
significant.
Unfortunately, conventional water treatment systems
could not remove Atrazine without great difficulty. Therefore, the
Water Systems wanted Novartis to pay for both the costs of testing raw
water for Atrazine and the resulting removal.
Because it found the Water Systems lacked standing, the district
court did not reach the merits of their claims of strict products
liability, negligence, strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities,
trespass, nuisance, or unjust enrichment. In order to having standing
to sue, the plaintiffs needed to show an injury in fact, a causal
connection between the injury and the manufacturing of Atrazine, and
finally, a likelihood that the injury was redressable by a favorable
decision. Because the Water Systems invoked federal jurisdiction, they
assumed the burden of establishing these elements.
The court found that neither Water System had suffered injury

